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More than any other twentieth-century writers, Walter Benjamin, Roland Barthes and Susan 
Sontag are associated with the theory of photography.1 Even after the emergence of digital 
image technologies in the 1990s, and its impact on photographic theory,2 one book especially, 
Camera Lucida by Barthes, continues to be perhaps the key point of reference for any 
theoretical discussion of photographic images, analogue or digital. This is despite the 
unapologetic realist position Barthes adopts, anchored in the psychological reality effects of 
the photograph’s indexicality (that is, the physical-causal relation between the object and its 
representation, according to C. S. Peirce’s semiotic theory), effects which have been seen as 
weakened or mediated in digital image-making. Barthes’s book, concerned as much with 
themes of absence, mourning, death and pain, filtered through the lens of autobiography (and 
published shortly before his own death in 1980), as on the nature of the photographic 
medium, has been criticized by art historians for its exclusive focus on portrait photography. 
Subsequently, the same objection has been levelled against photographic theory more 
generally.3 Nevertheless, Barthes’s hugely influential notion of the punctum, defined in the 
first part of Camera Lucida as an unintentional detail in a photographic image that 
emotionally ‘pierces’ the viewer,4 and hence provides a new, uniquely personal meaning and 
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value to the image, has been appropriated by art historians, including Michael Fried, in his 
major reappraisal of photography as an ‘anti-theatrical’ art. By virtue of the punctum, 
according to Fried’s ontological reading of the concept, photography defies the ‘theatricality’ 
characteristic of traditional art that prioritizes an intentionally created spectacle, since the 
presence of an unintended detail suggests a distinction between ‘seeing and being shown’. In 
other words, a punctum may be ‘seen’ by the beholder of the image without being 
intentionally ‘shown’ by the photographer.5 From this perspective, Fried argues that recent art 
photography continues in the anti-theatrical vein of modernist artistic traditions. 
 Such aesthetic arguments are, however, far removed from Barthes’s concerns in 
Camera Lucida, which must be seen in the context of a different tradition, centred on the 
psychological and social reality of photographic images of the human face and body. Barthes 
was of course not the first writer to draw conclusions concerning the perceptual and affective 
dynamics of photography as a medium on the basis of portraits as but one use or form of it. In 
his 1931 ‘Little History of Photography’, Benjamin famously wrote in relation to capturing 
the human face that ‘to do without people is for photography the most impossible of 
renunciations’.6 Although Benjamin addresses other photographic genres (such as 
architectural photographs of Paris by Eugène Atget and Germaine Krull), one of his lasting 
contributions to photographic theory is his analysis of the psychological impact of 
photographic portraits on the viewer as a result of the optical-mechanical recording of a 
moment of the sitter’s personal and historical time.   
Two recent books on photography decisively depart from the primacy of the portrait in 
such major writings in photographic history and theory. James Elkins and Liz Wells, both 
noted theorists and the editors of important reference works,7 instead turn their attention to 
genres that have received comparatively little scholarly attention. In Land Matters, Wells 
explores the complex interrelations between landscape photography, culture and identity (as 
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her subtitle indicates) from a cultural-critical and implicitly Foucauldian perspective. With an 
overarching concern for how photography prompts reflection on the representation and 
idealization of land and how, in turn, images of landscape engage political, social and 
environmental positions, Wells moves through a multi-faceted corpus of contemporary 
photography that geographically spans North America, Britain and Ireland, Scandinavia and 
the Baltic regions. Elkins’s What Photography Is, on the other hand, follows a more 
idiosyncratic itinerary. From photographs of selenite mineral deposits and frozen ice, to 
mountain ranges in the American West; from microscopic photographs of amoeba and dust, to 
atom bomb explosions, and finally, images of human pain, Elkins’s book is an attempt to 
discuss what photography is, or may be, outside of any discursive framework of genre or 
other pre-conceived categorization. Instead, he puts emphasis on the specific act of looking 
that photography (uniquely) prompts. While the two books under consideration are thus 
different from one another (if not diametrically opposed) in terms of argument, methodology 
and style, as this review essay will demonstrate, each manages to pave the way for new and 
intriguing critical debates on the status of the photographic image, in part through a deliberate 
avoidance of the portrait and through sustained engagement with photographs of the natural 
world. The importance and originality of these studies withstands the fact that some of their 
specific arguments are less than fully convincing. 
 
Against Portraiture 
Throughout his book Elkins is forcefully dismissive of portraiture as the key to understanding 
what makes photography unique and valuable among representational media. The reasons for 
this are pragmatic, to do with methodology, and profound in terms of their theoretical 
implications. Firstly, portraiture, according to Elkins, is a genre that inhibits the particular 
kind of looking at photographs that he self-reflexively pursues and writes about. Secondly, 
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Elkins’s rejection of portraiture is profound owing to that fact that it allows for a novel meta-
theoretical reflection on discourses on the medium, as primarily shaped by theorists such as 
Barthes and Benjamin. We have perhaps become too accustomed to accepting Benjamin’s 
conception of the psychological relation of the viewer of the photograph towards the person 
whom it depicts. In describing a 1843–7 photographic portrait of a Newhaven fishwife taken 
by the Scottish photographers David Octavius Hill and Robert Adamson, Benjamin 
emphasizes the ‘demand’ on the viewer made by photographic portraits, one which prompts 
curiosity as to the sitter’s identity in terms of her name, life story and feelings in a much more 
urgent and profoundly ethical way than painting ever could.8 In What Photography Is, by 
contrast, Elkins foregrounds a different kind of demand, not the Benjaminian one rooted in 
the human face. Looking at a stereoscopic image of a pine forest, he describes this and other 
photographs’ ‘demands’ as ‘inexplicable’ (76); they cannot be encompassed by, or reduced to, 
an empathetic human reaction to a face in a photograph (with any of its ethical implications). 
Instead, the photographs that Elkins is interested in speak to an apparently less personal and 
emotional aspect of photography that remains difficult to pin down in ethical, aesthetic, 
historical or (auto)biographical terms. It is a matter, Elkins paradoxically suggests, of the 
opposite of what we are usually accustomed to seeing in (or, better put, through) photographs, 
namely the represented object. His aim, by contrast, is to see photographs as material images. 
 Despite disagreeing with Barthes’s inductive approach (moving from consideration of 
the experience of specific portraits to generalizations about photography as such), Elkins’s 
exploration of the meaning and nature of photography is also an affirmation of Barthes’s way 
of writing on photography, of his style. Upon opening What Photography Is, readers familiar 
with the English edition of Barthes’s book will be immediately struck by the typographical 
layout, whose short, numbered sections self-consciously imitate Camera Lucida. 9 This visual 
mimicry is symptomatic of the entire book’s attitude towards Camera Lucida, which is 
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simultaneously acknowledged as a major reference point and rejected as ‘half-ruined theory’ 
and a ‘solipsistic story’ (7). Elkins’s assessment echoes something of the recognized hybridity 
of Camera Lucida as both photographic theory and autobiographical storytelling. He proposes 
to return to Camera Lucida only in order to ‘write against it’ (ix), but to do so in  a Barthesian 
fashion, predicated on staying true to one’s own experience of actually looking at 
photographic images, even if the images in question are of a very different kind. If Camera 
Lucida can aptly be summarized as a book on photographs charged with memory, loss, 
mourning, sentiment, emotion, affect, nostalgia and trauma, What Photography Is, by 
contrast, foregrounds the ‘non-humanist, emotionless’ side of photography (xi), characterized 
by a ‘lack of feeling’ and a ‘coldness’ that the medium also (re)presents (xii), in the author’s 
view. As a consequence of this ambiguous relation to its predecessor, much of the reward 
offered by Elkins’s book derives from the evocative force and richness of Barthes’s writing 
on photography and What Photography Is is both true to and radically different from Camera 
Lucida to the extent that Elkins’s inquiry, while adopting Barthes’s affirmative subjectivity, 
draws radically different conclusions. As in Barthes’s book, the style and argumentative line 
of Elkins’s study, written with his typical panache and lucidity, is meandering and circular 
rather than progressive. Just as Barthes did thirty years before him, Elkins often returns to the 
same ideas and images from different perspectives. 
 Elkins’s arguments against portraiture are also driven by a critique of the semiotic 
definition of photography as an indexical sign that has been a linchpin of photographic theory 
before and after the so-called digital turn.10 Although Barthes himself never used Peircean 
terminology – either in his pioneering semiotic writings on photography of the 1960s, rooted 
in Saussurean linguistics, or in Camera Lucida – his aforementioned realist position has 
justifiably been associated with discussions on photography’s indexicality. Elkins suggests 
that looking at photographs of panes of selenite and of black ice on a lake, that is, abstract 
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images of random patterns of mineral and ice formation, helps to ‘avoid’ debate on the 
indexical sign (23), since, for him, associated notions such as the freezing of a moment in 
time, the semiotic distinction between the object and its representation, and its psychological 
and emotional effects are irrelevant for an understanding of these images. Photography, 
Elkins continues, is less about light photons touching a sensitive surface, ensuring the 
indexical, or physical-causal, relation between an object and its representation, a process in 
itself automatic, optical-chemical and free from human meditation (as Bazin, Barthes and 
Sontag stress), but about ‘touching’ in the haptic sense of the word, in the form of the 
physical contact between a photograph finished or in-process and human hands (24). This is 
exemplified, for instance, in the fingerprint on a mid-nineteenth-century image by William 
Henry Fox Talbot, which bears witness, Elkins maintains, to the manual labour involved in 
producing photographs. 
 This hitherto neglected emphasis on the material surface of the photographic image as 
an object,11 goes ‘hand in hand’, in Elkins’s book, with a critique of Barthes’s punctum as a 
‘romantic attachment’ to images (38) and an excuse to ‘ignore the photographs themselves’ 
(40–1). He accuses Barthes of looking ‘beyond them for romance and memory’ (41) and of 
losing sight, in the process, of the image as an image. As a practical measure to gauge ‘what 
photography is’, at the beginning of chapter four, Elkins proposes a ‘series of farewells’ (99), 
methodologically discarding photographic portraiture in all its guises: family photographs of  
unknown people, found or vernacular photography, street photography capturing strangers as 
fleeting passers-by, fine art portraiture and photographs of his own family. Akin to Barthes’s 
own division of Camera Lucida into two parts, half-way through What Photography Is, and 
after the de-cluttering of photography of all ‘distractions’ potentially provided by the human 
figure (116), Elkins arrives at an apparent conceptual impasse, which, however, turns out to 
be a new starting point for a differently oriented investigation. He declares that ‘photography 
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as a whole is, in the end, (...) a bit boring’ (126). One should not hasten to attribute irony to 
this seemingly flippant comment. Rather, what Elkins is attempting to emphasize is a value 
and meaning of photography stripped of all emotional, cultural and historical associations, all 
the ‘unwanted stuff’, as he writes (116). In terms of the image itself, what is left is what 
Elkins terms the ‘surround’ (116), the unintentional, often unnoticed surrounding of a figure 
or object, which he contrasts with the intentional painterly background. 
 Considering that Elkins is first and foremost interested in seeing photographs, rather 
than constructing and relaying ‘stories about acts of looking’ (124, my emphasis), his focus 
on the ‘surround’ serves as the focal point of such seeing. Whereas Barthes shifts the 
emphasis in the second part of Camera Lucida towards mourning, death and trauma, implied 
in his definition of punctum as the ‘that-has-been’ of a (portrait) photograph,12 for Elkins the 
‘end’ of description and language is not related to trauma, but to seeing without distractions 
(149). Fittingly, the last part of his fourth chapter is devoted to microscopic photographs of 
amoeba, which are undefined, transparent creatures blurring with their surrounding in a way 
as to deny a clear distinction between figure and surround. According to Elkins, such 
microscopic images of amoeba (many of which illustrate his text) are prime examples for 
questioning ‘habits of seeing’, which, as he suggests, ignore the surround in favour of the 
figure (152). For Elkins it is precisely the refocusing of perceptual attention towards that 
which is most often ignored that enables thinking about ‘what photography is’. 
 While it becomes increasingly clear as What Photography Is proceeds that Elkins 
takes issue, primarily, with Barthes’s definitions of photography in general, and not his claims 
about the kind of experiences triggered by the Winter Garden photograph of his late mother as 
a child, Elkins also rejects more specific points in Barthes’s analysis, especially when the 
French theorist comments on the type of photographs which the American art historian is 
most interested in. For example, Elkins’s short fifth chapter deals with ‘rapatronic’ images of 
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nuclear bomb explosions, that is, photographs taken in the 1940s and ’50s by the pioneering 
American photographer Harold E. Edgerton with his high-speed camera with a millionth-of-a-
second shutter speed. Elkins reminds us of Barthes’s laconic remark with regards to 
Edgerton’s famous images of milk drops hitting a liquid surface: ‘(little need to admit that this 
kind of photography neither touches nor even interests me: I am too much of a 
phenomenologist to like anything but appearances to my own measure)’ (161).13 Objecting to 
Barthes’s confining his interest to a ‘phenomenological understanding’ of objects represented 
to human size and scope, Elkins suggests that such ‘images not made to the measure of 
human experience’ (162, my emphasis) can nonetheless ‘elicit a strongly embodied reaction’ 
(161).  
 With respect to one striking image of an atomic test explosion by the American 
photographer (Figure 1), Elkins provides an illustration of his argument. Describing the object 
represented in this photograph first metaphorically as something ‘like a nectarine, left to rot at 
the back of the refrigerator until it has half-sunk into the shelf’ (162), he goes on to discover 
the trees at the bottom of the picture and further explores how the nectarine metaphor fails the 
experience of this particular photograph. ‘The object in this picture refuses to be described in 
terms of things I know’, he writes, which leads him into ‘a kind of visual desperation’, rooted 
in an inability to describe what he sees (164). It is at this point that Elkins provides an explicit 
hint at ‘what photography is’, namely a visual medium that, counter-intuitively, it must be 
added, ‘gives us all kinds of things that we don’t want it to give us. Things we prefer not to 
dwell on (...). But also things that we cannot quite make sense of (...)’ (174). In short, 
‘[p]hotography is at war with our attention’ (174). Attention, in Elkins’s view, is usually 
granted to the familiar, explainable and understandable and to those areas of knowledge that 
photography theory has instructed us about (akin to Barthes’s studium), but also, and equally, 
to the personal, affective, emotional and sentimental (Barthes’s punctum). 
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 To further sustain his paradoxical thesis that photography is what we do not want to 
see, in his concluding chapter Elkins turns to other photographs ‘not to human measure’. Here 
he focuses on what he calls photography’s ‘harshest property’ (180), namely the 
representation of human pain. His example is a series of four or five ‘lingqi’ photographs 
from 1901–5, showing a Chinese execution practice consisting in cutting into the living body 
(which fascinated George Bataille who reproduced a number of these images in his Tears of 
Eros). However, quite unlike Bataille’s or the surrealists’ interest in these photographs, Elkins 
is still concerned with ‘rigid seeing’ (208), consisting of a painstakingly detailed and strict 
formal analysis of these images (which are also reproduced in the book to allow the reader to 
compare the images with Elkins’s meticulous description). Even though he insists on 
discussing ‘the body in pain, not the face’ (179), this final analysis of photographic images in 
What Photography Is represents an unexpected return to the human figure. Elkins is adamant 
that his formal, emotionally detached analysis is diametrically opposed to Barthes’s ‘he-is-
going-to-die’ approach, which is an ‘escape from seeing into reverie’, in Elkins’s view (210). 
Yet he nevertheless insists that the ‘pain of interpretation’ evident in his analysis of the 
‘lingqi’ images is ‘much worse (...) in photography than (...) in painting or film’ (210). This 
argument about medium-specificity appears as an inadvertent return to the realist question of 
photography’s indexicality and all its phenomenological implications for the viewer. It is 
fundamentally unclear why and how the ‘pain’ of interpreting these photographs is ‘much 
worse’ than that of a painting of the subject for any other reason except that we (consciously 
or unconsciously) see and know them as ‘real’, that is, as indexical images of human suffering 
which occurred in front of the camera. Although this apparent smuggling in through the back 
door of photographic specificity rooted in the indexical and iconic reality quotient of the 
image is not directly tackled by Elkins, his final definition, according to which ‘[p]hotography 
is a camera dolorosa (...): a compound of displeasures’ (219), does not appear as far removed 
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from Barthes as is suggested, when Elkins argues that Barthes’s temporal punctum or, in his 
words, the ‘sign of death in photography (...) is in the end just another source of pleasure’ 
because it apparently hides ‘actual pain’ (220). In the end, Elkins’s book is perhaps more 
similar to Camera Lucida than the reader (and perhaps the author himself) would have 
expected on the basis of the at times callous adjectives used to describe Barthes’s quest and 
indeed of the argument of the first five chapters of What Photography Is.  
 
For Landscape 
Whereas Elkins pits landscape images against portraiture to highlight the non-cultural, de-
subjectivized and material ways of seeing photographic images that pictures of natural 
phenomena may bring to the fore, Wells in Land Matters demonstrates affirmatively how the 
content, form and metaphor of landscape photographs, amounting to a recognizable genre, 
come together to engage questions about history, representation and identity. Moreover, if 
Elkins strongly opposes the Barthesian sentimental ‘reverie’ (210) that portrait photographs 
are prone to prompt, for Wells, landscape imagery positively activates a valuable ‘reverie’ by 
providing an ‘imaginary substitute’ (44) for actual, synaesthetic outdoor experience mixed 
with memory and imagination. Diametrically opposed to Elkins’s tabula rasa approach, and 
as the multiple levels of meaning of the title Land Matters indicate, Wells’s aim is to explore 
the politically, ideologically, culturally and historically freighted aspects of landscape 
photography, including its critical ‘interventionist’ function (9). 
 The different approaches in question can be paradigmatically juxtaposed in relation to 
the ‘rephotography’ project by American photographer Mark Klett et al., which both Elkins 
and Wells discuss. Rephotography, as the term suggests, consists in re-photographing the 
same sites (e.g. locations in the American West) at different moments in time (which may 
even involve different generations of photographers), resulting in remarkably similar (Figures 
11 
 
2a–c)14 or, at times, surprisingly different views. Elkins exploits the comparative dimension 
of these necessarily serial photographs in order to draw attention to what he calls ‘pointless’ 
searches (63) for minute differences in two or more images and, by extension, in order to 
emphasize a self-reflexive questioning on the ‘min[ing] [of] images for meaning’, ‘a 
solution’, ‘a significance’ (61), and on what may or may not constitute ‘normal seeing’ of a 
photographic image (68). Wells, on the other hand, contends (more in line with the 
photographers’ intentions) that Klett’s rephotography projects combine ‘aesthetic issues and 
photographic histories and methods [with] topographies of social, geographic and geological 
change’ (130). For Elkins, such searching for the ‘histories’ would imply ‘leaving the 
exactitude of these images behind’ (63), that is, a distraction from seeing what the 
photographs actually show.  
 These differences notwithstanding, Wells acknowledges that photography alone 
‘cannot account for social developments’ (130). Rather, her approach to landscape 
photography is marked by Foucauldian notions of discourse. This entails an understanding of 
photography as ‘a discursive system’ (12), along the lines advocated by American-based 
photography theorist John Tagg15 (whom Wells, however, does not cite), rather than a neutral 
conveyor of literal content and meaning, or as ‘pure’ visual form. In this respect, Wells’s 
argument is notably influenced by Rosalind Krauss’s seminal essay, ‘Photography’s 
Discursive Spaces’,16 which critiques the appropriation of Timothy O’Sullivan’s nineteenth-
century geographical survey photography by twentieth-century modernist discourses as ‘art’. 
The particular photograph that served Krauss as a starting point in her essay is tellingly 
reproduced as a frontispiece illustration in Wells’s Land Matters. However, Wells de-
emphasizes historical shifts between nineteenth- and twentieth-century discourses on 
photography, and instead highlights how contemporary art-market contexts (including art-
book publications, gallery and museum exhibitions) negatively impact on the cultural-critical 
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potential of practices of landscape photography of the last twenty years. In spite of this 
increasing commercialization since the 1990s, Wells observes a shift towards a ‘critical 
tendency’ in contemporary practice that foregrounds a genre-specific ‘politics of place’ as 
pertaining to what she appropriately defines as a ‘grounded aesthetics’ (10), as distinct from 
metaphysical notions, such as the Romantic sublime. This is understood as a post-modern 
practice in which ‘formal and thematic perceptions are situated within socio-historical 
contexts’ (10). The critical position which Wells identifies in contemporary practice is rooted, 
first and foremost, in the work and research carried out by individual photographers, whom 
she considers as ‘authors’ in the Foucauldian sense. She argues (at the end of her study) that 
authority pertains to ‘consistency of ways of looking and seeing’, that is, the coherent style of 
a body of work (281). The photographer is thus described as an ‘investigator and storyteller’ 
(281) whose deployment of ‘photographic codes, aesthetic conventions, and the semiotics of 
scale and titling’ ‘enhances our sense of careful consideration [of the photographs] thereby 
lending further authority to the stories told’ (284). Along these lines, the documentary 
function of the photographic image (rooted in its indexicality), with which photography’s 
‘authenticity’ has traditionally been associated, is replaced by the authenticity and authority of 
the artist-photographer (7). This conceptual paradigm, which is addressed head-on only at the 
end of the book, has, however, important methodological implications for the preceding 
chapters, namely that Wells affords particular attention to the photographers’ statements about 
their own work, which often provide the backbone of her interpretations of specific 
photographic œuvres. Nevertheless, the attendant danger of reading into images what the 
photographers intended them to be is circumvented by virtue of careful, detailed 
contextualization in national, regional and local terms. Thus, after a more broadly focused 
opening chapter on the evolution and history of the landscape genre in both painting and 
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photography, the remaining five chapters, richly illustrated, are dedicated to landscape 
photography in specific national and geographical contexts.  
 Framing discussion of specific photographs and bodies of work with relevant 
historical context, chapters two and three span issues of colonial settlement in the United 
States and Canada as well as notions of ‘wilderness’ associated with the American West. 
Wells draws on a varied corpus of photographs, a heterogeneity which, in her view, reflects 
the complexities of immigration histories and also the different attitudes towards land use and 
environmental change. At the same time, a common characteristic of the images and their 
creators, according to Wells, is their simultaneous concern with ‘pastoral myth and economic 
demand’ (69), such as, for instance, in the photography of John Pfahl. His series of waterfalls 
is described as ‘critically investigative’ (60) for the reason that Pfahl’s photographs juxtapose 
the natural power of water (through wide-angle perspective) with its industrial usage (through 
inclusion of waterwheels in the picture plane, for example). The socio-historical potential of 
representing water in landscape imagery is similarly discussed in relation to the American 
West where the scarcity of water renders its use (and depiction in photography) ‘highly 
political’ (151). The work of Peter Goin, one of the photographers involved in a collaborative 
project on water demand and usage called ‘Water in the West’ (which included photographer 
Mark Klett), is not only concerned with water as a limited resource, but also raises the 
question, through his involvement in publications and exhibitions, of ‘how photographers as 
artists can contribute to public debate’ (152). Wells summarizes this and other projects by 
American photographers by suggesting that ‘in contemporary culture ethics pertaining to land 
is (...) associated with ecological and environmental concerns and with debates about 
conservation and sustainability’ (157); a tendency which nonetheless coexists with 
photographic bodies of work that are less politically charged and which emphasize the awe-
inspiring sublimity and beauty of nature, as in the case of Ansel Adams, whose famous 
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photographs taken in the Yosemite national park in the 1960s continue to influence current 
landscape photography through their iconic status. 
 After a chapter concerned with British photography, where investigation of land and 
landscape is deeply bound up with ideological discourses on class, gender and ethnicity, as 
well as with the patriarchal and the pastoral, which Wells sees challenged (since the 1970s 
and ’80s) by a pronounced turning away from modernist preoccupations with form towards a 
new critique emerging ‘from image content’ (191), chapter five turns to a relatively neglected 
region in terms of landscape photography specifically and photographic history more 
generally: the Baltic region and Scandinavia. The inclusion of Nordic countries in discussion 
of landscape photography is particularly fitting, given the relatively sparse spread of 
urbanization in these countries, allowing for land and landscape to ‘contribute to the inflection 
of national cultures and concerns, and, arguably [to] play a key role in the construction of 
national psyches’ (218). Among the Scandinavian photographers featuring in this chapter, 
who to some degree share a pronounced interest in weather and light, and its movement and 
modulation of objects, is Sweden-based Petter Magnusson. His photograph Explosion, No.1 
(2002) shows a remote mountain settlement in Norway, one of whose isolated houses is 
blown up in a (digitally generated) explosion which destroys the Norwegian dream of the 
‘idyll of the rural retreat’, as Wells notes (223).17 While her discussion of photography from 
the Baltic regions surprisingly concludes that there is ‘less stress than might have been 
anticipated on exploring land as territory and heritage’, the chapter ends with consideration of 
photography from Finland where, by contrast, ‘land and environment is central to (...) 
contemporary practice’ (241), especially in the photographs of Jorma Puranen, whose work is 
tightly bound up with national culture and history, thus serving as a prime example in Wells’s 
exploration of these themes.  
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 The final chapter of Land Matters is focused on how landscape photography engages 
collective and personal memory, thereby contributing to self-identity formation. In this 
respect, it is also an unexpected turn towards the personal, a shift that – less surprisingly – 
draws inspiration from Barthes’s Camera Lucida. In line with Barthes’s view of the capacity 
of photographs with a punctum to act as potential triggers for a play of personal memory and 
imagination, Wells argues that landscape photography ‘may reconfigure memory’, rather than 
simply confirm it (290). This pertains, she suggests, to the ‘fluidity of the inter-relation of 
imagery, personal recollection and collective history’ (290), which brings into play what 
Wells somewhat misleadingly terms the viewer’s ‘haptic unconscious’, understood as a 
complement to the Benjaminian ‘optical unconscious’ of the photographic camera and 
defined as responses to an image ‘in terms of senses other than sight’ (290–1). The 
subsequent reference to Proust’s In Search of Lost Time must be counted as a stock reference 
in photographic theory in discussions of the synaesthetic quality of photographic images, 
which make us ‘hear’, ‘smell’, ‘feel’ and ‘taste’ as much as they make us see (291). Coming 
to Wells’s book after reading Elkins, one is tempted to observe just how difficult it is to 
escape the affective charge of photography, and of cultural and theoretical reference points 
centred on it that discourses on photography have canonized over the years.  
 From this perspective, Wells’s (re-)affirmation, at the very end of her study, of the 
interpretative and evocative power of ‘subjective associations and collective identity’ brought 
into play by landscape photography (302), with reference to Barthes’s Camera Lucida, also 
brings us full circle. That is, back to the starting point of Elkins’s meta-theoretical book. 
While Wells and Elkins share a desire to investigate photography beyond portraiture (for the 
different reasons discussed here), the conclusions drawn from their investigations are 
remarkably incongruent, or, from a different perspective, surprisingly complementary. Both 
What Photography Is and Land Matters ultimately demonstrate that one answer to the 
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question of ‘what photography is’, is a type of imagery that not only warrants, but often 
compels response in the form of language, whether this language is emotional and nostalgic 
(Barthes), formal and coldly analytic (Elkins), or socio-cultural and critical (Wells). And it is 
perhaps a particular quality of photography that such apparently opposing and opposed 
discourses not only co-exist, but fruitfully enter into dialogue with each other. 
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